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The U.N. process to develop the Arms Trade Treaty began in 2006 with the adoption of General 
Assembly Resolution 61/89, which re-
quested the Secretary-General form a 
Group of Governmental Experts to in-
vestigate the feasibility, scope and man-
date of a comprehensive convention and 
report its findings to the 63rd session of 
the General Assembly. The international 
treaty campaign led by activists, NGOs, 
officials and policy experts, was started 
years earlier, however, and has grown 
considerably since its inception. In 2008, 
thousands of demonstrators around the 
world voiced their demand for greater 
accountability of the world’s arms pro-
ducers and exporters, and for the contin-
ued cooperation of the member states to 
work toward a consensus. As expected, 
the proposed treaty will cover transfers 
of a variety of conventional weapons, in-
cluding small arms/light weapons.
In late October 2008, 147 nations 
voted in favor of moving forward with 
the negotiation of a comprehensive U.N. treaty to regulate the 
trade of conventional weapons worldwide. On 24 December, 
the General Assembly officially adopted the draft resolu-
tion, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common 
International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer 
of Conventional Arms, calling for an Open-Ended Working 
Group to convene semi-annually over the next three years “to 
further consider those elements in the report of the Group of 
Governmental Experts where consensus could be developed 
for their inclusion in an eventual legally binding treaty.”1 The 
Open-Ended Working Group is not tasked with negotiating 
the treaty but with examining issues that could be addressed 
in a treaty. Further action is required by the United Nations 
General Assembly to actually start the negotiation.
SA/LW and the Arms Trade Treaty 
by Zach Wall and Lauren Nicole Hill [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
Despite the efforts of governments, nongovernmental organizations, and disarmament and 
human rights activists worldwide, the global arms trade continues to exacerbate the situation 
caused by conventional weapons and, in particular, small arms/light weapons. Proliferation 
of SA/LW not only fuels conflict, but also disrupts development in war-ravaged regions. The 
following article provides an overview of SA/LW-control issues and remediation efforts. It also 
considers the progress of the international movement in support of an arms-trade treaty.
The proposed treaty, known as the ATT, will be the first legally-
binding, international agreement of its kind. Proponents claim 
that existing programs designed to police the arms trade have 
made important strides, but that stronger controls are essen-
tial to confront the growing humanitarian crisis caused by 
unchecked arms proliferation. Furthermore, non-state actors 
exploit gaps in existing policy to acquire weapons used to un-
dermine development and human rights. 
Small Arms/Light Weapons 
Among conventional weapons, SA/LW are particularly 
problematic as they are relatively easy to use and are easily ac-
cessible. The term “small arms” refers to a category of weapons 
designed for individual use, including pistols, machine and 
submachine guns, assault rifles, and hand grenades, among 
others. “Light weapons” typically include conventional weap-
ons that are designed to be operated by a group of two or more 
individuals (although they may be operated by individual 
combatants as well). These weapons include heavy machine 
guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank missiles and rocket sys-
tems, and man-portable air-defense systems (also known as 
MANPADS). Moreover, they are often the weapons of choice 
of non-state actors, including terrorist organizations and 
paramilitary insurgents.2 
MANPADS and U.S. SA/LW Remediation 
MANPADS pose a unique threat to global safety as these 
light weapons threaten the security of military and civilian 
aircraft. MANPADS use infrared technology and other ad-
vanced technology to deploy surface-to-air missiles directed at 
aircraft. Despite the magnitude of damage MANPADS yield, 
they require minimal training to operate, are easily concealed 
and can be transported in the trunks of cars or even smaller 
cargo areas. Consequently, they are considered some of the 
most potentially destabilizing contemporary weapons systems 
available today and are associated with irregular warfare.3 
MANPADS are relatively inexpensive weapons, which rest on 
the shoulders of their users and weigh as little as 30 pounds (14 
kilograms). Conservative estimates suggest there are at least 
500,000 MANPADS in the world today, many of which are 
readily available on the black market to NSAs.4 
The issue of MANPADS proliferation is a national-defense 
priority for the United States. The U.S. Department of State in-
tensified efforts to prevent NSAs from acquiring MANPADS 
after the attempted shootdown of a commercial airliner leav-
ing Mombassa, Kenya, in late 2002. Since then, the Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State has assisted 27 
nations in destroying more than 27,000 MANPADS missiles 
and securing those that remain in national stocks. PM/WRA 
works to keep weapons from re-circulating and destabilizing 
hard-won but fragile peace in post-conflict areas where the 
threat of illicit SA/LW and MANPADS falling into the hands 
of NSAs is most acute. For example, in 2003–04, PM/WRA 
provided technical assistance in destroying 33,000 SA/LW, 
including 45 MANPADS in post-civil war Liberia.5
The United States remains commit-
ted to combating illicit arms trafficking 
in conflict and post-conflict areas around 
the world. PM/WRA strives to limit the 
access of terrorist or criminal groups to 
conventional weapons and munitions 
from national stockpiles or abandoned 
caches. Since 2001, PM/WRA has assist-
ed with SA/LW-remediation efforts in 36 
countries, securing weapons stockpiles 
and destroying 1.3 million excess weap-
ons and more than 50,000 tons of ord-
nance. However, weapons destruction 
addresses only one aspect of the larger 
problem, and arms-control approaches 
that merely focus on keeping stockpiles 
secure and destroying excess weapons 
are incomplete. For this reason, the U.S. government endorses 
a “cradle to the grave” approach to weapons exports and im-
ports. The United States regulates brokering activities on all 
of its weapons, and U.S. brokering laws and regulations are 
“considered the most robust in the world.”6
International efforts to combat the global SA/LW problem 
have resulted in strengthening controls on the export and 
transfer of SA/LW, including MANPADS. Non-proliferation 
strategies in these regions help to secure weapons, ensure that 
governments have policies on control and proliferation, and 
reduce the number of MANPADS available to NSAs.4
The United Nations and Illicit Arms Trade 
The issue of illegal small-arms proliferation first came un-
der the spotlight of the United Nations during the mid-1990s. 
Prompted by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General 
formed a Group of Governmental Experts to investigate the 
humanitarian implications of the illicit SA/LW trade. Then, 
in July 2001, the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held 
in New York, and the participating states agreed to adopt the 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the 
Illicit Arms Trade in All Its Aspects.6 The Programme of Action 
aims to curb illicit small-arms trafficking at the national, re-
gional and global levels. Since its implementation, the pro-
gram has served as an important framework for preventing 
international illegal small-arms trade.
At the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made 
in the Implementation of the Programme of Action, 26 June–7 
July 2006, then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan said of the 
United Nations’ arms-control pursuits, “Our targets remain 
unscrupulous arms brokers, corrupt officials, drug-trafficking 
syndicates, criminals and others who bring death and mayhem 
into our communities, who ruin lives and destroy in minutes 
the labor of years. To halt the destructive march of armed con-
flict, we must stop such purveyors of death.”7 In the summer 
of 2008, a third semi-annual meeting convened, marking the 
seventh year of the PoA’s implementation. Despite significant 
strides since 2001, many, including Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon, have noted the generally slow progress in adequately 
addressing the Programme of Action’s national-, regional- 
and global-level objectives. The Secretary-General previously 
reported, “At the global level, States were unable to agree to 
substantive outcomes of the biannual meetings,” owing in part 
The co-authors of the Arms Trade Treaty resolution (Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, 
Kenya and the United Kingdom) launch the ATT at a meeting as part of the 63rd United Nations General 
Assembly session, which began 16 September 2009. 
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to the fact that the PoA “does not provide a specific framework 
to facilitate international assistance and cooperation among 
states. Hence, states have had difficulty finding cooperative 
structures and linking needs with resources.”8
Working Toward a Treaty 
Presently, a single, comprehensive, legally-binding instru-
ment for regulating the international transfer of conventional 
weapons does not exist. For pragmatic reasons, existing con-
ventional weapons treaties, such as the Ottawa Convention9 
and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons10 
(which includes weapons with “indiscriminant” effects), are 
limited in scope and regulate only specific types of arms traf-
ficking. At the regional level, many governments have imple-
mented agreements aimed at curbing conventional weapons 
proliferation in recent years. Some of these agreements are the 
Central American Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers11 (2006), 
the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
Their Ammunition and other Related Materials12 (2006), and 
The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction 
of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region 
and the Horn of Africa13 (2005), and have been met with vary-
ing degrees of success.14 Nevertheless, an internationally-recog-
nized and legally-binding measure carrying the clout of the 
Ottawa Convention or the recently adopted Convention on 
Cluster Munitions15 has not yet been formulated. However, 
campaigners for an arms-trade treaty have made significant 
headway since 2006. 
The Control Arms campaign—a collaborative effort of the 
NGOs Amnesty International, Oxfam International and the 
International Action Network on Small Arms—has worked 
toward the goal of a global arms-trade treaty since October 
2003. The treaty envisioned by the Control Arms campaign 
would hold states accountable for international weapons 
transfers, ensuring that those weapons should not be used to 
commit human-rights abuses, either directly or indirectly. 
The text of the ATT, therefore, should include stipulations 
about the use or likely use of arms.16
Feasibility, Scope and Parameters
In December 2006, due in part to the effort of interna-
tional activists, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 
61/89.17 A majority of nations (153) voted in favor of the reso-
lution, which prompted the Secretary-General to (a) solicit 
member states’ views on a speculative arms-trade treaty and 
(b) form a Group of Governmental Experts representing 28 
countries to investigate the “feasibility, scope and parameters” 
of such a treaty. This group convened for three sessions and, in 
August 2008, nearly issued a final report18 with its findings. 
Ninety-six states submitted views on the ATT, and among 
them, 89 concluded that such an instrument was feasible, but 
voiced concerns about the obstacles in implementing an at-
tainable treaty. These reservations included, for example, the 
probable reluctance of major arms exporters to comply with a 
treaty, the inability of some states to live up to the challenges 
of implementing the treaty, and the overall task of crafting an 
ATT capable of satisfying the particular interests of all mem-
ber states.19 The feasibility of an arms-trade treaty is depen-
dent on both its scope and its parameters. According to the 
Group of Governmental Experts’ final report, to be feasible, 
the proposed treaty would need to have “clear definitions 
and be fair, objective, balanced, non-political, non-discrimi-
natory and universal within the framework of the United 
Nations.”18 Therefore, an international consensus on what 
types of weapons should be included, as well as what kinds of 
transactions constitute “transfer,” (i.e., the scope of the treaty) 
will be essential to the negotiation of the treaty. The Group of 
Governmental Experts concluded that the parameters of the 
ATT should be consistent with the existing international hu-
man rights laws, and it should not infringe on the sovereign 
rights of individual states. The Group of Governmental Experts 
also determined that a realistic framework should take into 
account issues such as terrorism, organized crime, socioeco-
nomic development and regional stability. Furthermore, the 
group recommended national annual transparency reports be 
written and presented to members similar to those required 
by the Ottawa Convention and the CCW.
 
2009 and Onward 
Following the release of the Group of Governmental 
Experts report, the mobilization of international support for a 
second ATT resolution continued with renewed energy during 
the 63rd session of the U.N. General Assembly. A week of action 
took place 13–19 September 2008, during which disarmament 
campaigners from all over the world held demonstrations 
and urged member states to vote in favor of continuing the 
development of an international treaty. On 21 October 2008, 
days before the vote, Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu of South Africa issued a video message urging 
member states to “end the slaughter” wrought by the interna-
tional arms trade, announcing, “All around the world, people 
are watching, waiting and holding you to account. They are 
demanding an ATT with human rights at its heart. It is down 
to each and every one of you to see it done.”20
At the 63rd session of the U.N. General Assembly on 
23 October 2008, 133 nations voted in favor of the new 
resolution, while one state abstained and 119 opposed. The 
decision demonstrated continued international support 
for the development and eventual implementation of the 
treaty. The U.N. process, which is open to all member states, 
will continue over the next three years with semi-annual 
meetings of the Open-Ended Working Group. During this 
phase, the Open-Ended Working Group will convene for 
six one-week sessions to consider the recommendations 
of the Group of Governmental Experts and address key 
concerns of the treaty’s scope and implementation. The 
first of these sessions took place 2–6 March 2009, in New 
York City, and was attended by numerous member-state 
representatives, including the United States. According to a 
statement the U.S. representative21 made to the meeting, the 
United States is planning to be active in developing effective 
outcomes from the findings of the Open-Ended Working 
Group. However, it is still too early to determine whether 
“the discussions show promise for effective and positive 
contribution to solving the problems” of the illicit arms 
trade and SA/LW proliferation.5 
The second session of the Open-Ended Working Group 
convened in New York City in July 2009. The group will 
presented a report of its discussions to the 64th session of 
the U.N. General Assembly this fall.22  The ATT is still in the 
early stages of formation and the discussions will continue 
for a minimum of three years. The efforts of millions of 
supporters across the globe have not gone unnoticed, and 
the ATT’s progress has been apparent, especially in 2008. 
At least one important question for the future remains and 
it involves the role the United States, a global leader in SA/
LW remediation efforts, will play in the treaty-negotiation 
process. Nevertheless, the relative success of the Ottawa 
Zach Wall was an Editorial Assistant at the Center for 
International Stabilization and Recovery from September 2007 
through May 2009. He graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in sociol-
ogy from James Madison University in 2009, and is on tour with 
his band for the summer.
Zach Wall 
Editorial Assistant 
The Journal of ERW and Mine Action
Mine Action Information Center
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
James Madison University
E-mail: maic@jmu.edu
Lauren Nicole Hill has been a part of the CISR team as an Editorial 
Assistant since August 2008. She will graduate from James Madison 
University in 2010 with a Bachelor of Arts in communication studies 
with a concentration in public relations and a minor in Italian. 
Lauren Nicole Hill 
Editorial Assistant 
The Journal of ERW and Mine Action
Mine Action Information Center





Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
U.S. Department of State
SA-3, Suite 6100 (PM/WRA)
2121 Virginia Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20522 / USA
Tel: +1 202 663 0100
Fax: +1 202 663 0090
E-mail: DavisSB@state.gov
Web site: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra
Control Arms campaigners hold envelopes containing Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s message outside the 
U.N. headquarters in New York City. The Control Arms campaign is an international campaign run by Oxfam 
International, Amnesty International and the International Action Network on Small Arms. It calls for a strong 
treaty to stop the transfer of weapons which fuel conflict, poverty and human rights abuses.
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Convention and the adoption of the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions in 2008 indicate that the international community 
remains committed to waging the war against unchecked 
weapons proliferation. 
See Endnotes, Page 113
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